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Drafting a “Sensible”  
Conscience Clause:  
A PROPOSAL FOR MEANINGFUL 
CONSCIENCE PROTECTIONS FOR 
RELIGIOUS EMPLOYERS OBJECTING  
TO THE MANDATED COVERAGE  
OF PRESCRIPTION CONTRACEPTIVES 
Daniel J. Rudary† 
“[U]nder the new rule our institutions would be free to act in 
accord with Catholic teaching on life and procreation only if they 
were to stop hiring and serving non-Catholics . . . . Could the 
federal government possibly intend to pressure Catholic institutions 
to cease providing health care, education and charitable services to 
the general public? Health care reform should expand access to 
basic health care for all, not undermine that goal.”1 
–Daniel Cardinal DiNardo, Archbishop of Galveston-Houston and 
Chairman of the US Catholic Bishops’ Committee on Pro-Life 
Activities 
 
† J.D. candidate, 2013, Case Western Reserve University School of Law; 
B.A., 2010, University of Richmond. The author would like to thank 
Professor Sharona Hoffman and the Health Matrix Editorial Staff for their 
guidance and assistance throughout the writing and editing process. The 
author also acknowledges that on the eve of this Note’s publication, the 
Obama Administration proposed significant changes to its contraceptive 
coverage rules for religious institutions. Although these developments are 
not addressed herein, it is his hope that this Note nevertheless underscores 
why the mandate as originally conceived presented significant legal 
problems that the administration and interested parties are now seeking to 
alleviate through additional rulemaking. Accordingly, it is hoped that this 
piece, despite its failure to address these most recent developments, may 
still play a role in analyzing the legal framework behind this controversial 
and very topical subject.  
1. HHS Mandate For Contraceptive And Abortifacient Drugs Violates 
Conscience Rights, UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS 
(Aug.1, 2011), http://www.usccb.org/news/2011/11-154.cfm. 
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Introduction 
On May 17, 2009, President Barack Obama took the stage at the 
University of Notre Dame to make a commencement appearance that 
was, by his own admission, “not . . . without controversy.”2 Upset by the 
University’s decision to bestow an honorary doctor of laws degree on a 
pro-choice President, many in the Catholic community called on Notre 
Dame to rescind Mr. Obama’s invitation and reaffirm its commitment to 
the Church’s teaching on the sanctity of human life. During his speech, 
the President attempted to mollify these concerns and achieve broader, 
bipartisan support for health care reform by calling for “a sensible 
 
2. President Barack Obama, Commencement Address at the University of 
Notre Dame (May 17, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/remarks-president-notre-dame-commencement. 
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conscience clause” rooted in the need to ensure that “all of our health 
care policies are grounded not only in sound science, but also in clear 
ethics.”3  
Less than a year after his speech at Notre Dame, President Obama 
laid the cornerstone of his domestic agenda by signing the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA or Act) into law, 
fundamentally reforming the nation’s health care system and spawning a 
political and legal debate that led all the way to the Supreme Court.4 
While the law’s most controversial component has undoubtedly been the 
so-called “individual mandate” to purchase health insurance, a similarly 
passionate debate regarding the law’s implications for religious 
employers has also brought the Obama Administration into direct 
conflict with the Catholic Church.5  
The ACA regulates the national health insurance market by directly 
regulating group health plans and health insurance issuers. One of the 
provisions of the Act mandates that health plans provide coverage 
without cost sharing for women’s preventive care and directs the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services (HHS) to determine which 
services are to be covered under the mandate.6 On August 1, 2011, the 
Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Labor, 
and the Department of the Treasury promulgated an interim final rule 
 
3. Id.  
4. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 
124 Stat. 119 (2010); Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 26 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); National Federation of 
Independent Businesses v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012).  
5. The author acknowledges that bona fide objections to the HHS mandate 
have been raised by a variety of religious bodies, including orthodox Jewish 
and Protestant communities. Because a compelling interest analysis under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act requires a determination as to 
whether or not a regulation burdens a specific plaintiff’s religious beliefs, 
however, this Note will limit itself to addressing whether the theological 
and moral objections raised by Catholic employers translate into a viable 
cause of action under the Act. As courts applying the RFRA have 
acknowledged, it is much easier to conduct a free-exercise analysis in the 
context of hierarchical religions like Catholicism as opposed to other bodies 
with less-definite and less well-known teachings. See, e.g., Mack v. 
O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996) (acknowledging that certain 
tests for applying the RFRA require courts “to determine the authoritative 
sources of law for the religion in question and to interpret the commands 
emanating from those sources. In the case of hierarchical religions such as 
Roman Catholicism, this process of identification and interpretation, which 
resembles the procedures of legal positivism, is feasible. In the case of 
nonhierarchical religions, however, such as Islam, Judaism, and a multitude 
of Protestant sects, the process is infeasible, or at least very difficult and 
attended with a high degree of indeterminacy.”).  
6. Coverage of Preventive Health Services, 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(4) (2006). 
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on mandated preventative care that required all group health plans and 
health insurance issuers to provide, without cost sharing, all 
contraceptive methods and sterilization procedures approved by the 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA).7  
The Catholic Church, however, has consistently taught that the use 
of contraception is gravely sinful.8 While the HHS mandate includes an 
exemption for “religious employers,” Catholic hospitals, universities, and 
charitable organizations have taken issue with its narrow criteria,9 which 
require that a “religious employer” (1) have the primary purpose of 
inculcating religious values, (2) primarily employ only those who share 
its beliefs, (3) primarily serve individuals of the same faith, and (4) 
qualify as a nonprofit organization under Sections 6033(a)(1) and 
6033(a)(3)(A)(i) or (iii) of the Internal Revenue Code.10  
Rather than promoting the “sensible” compromise that President 
Obama spoke about at Notre Dame, Church leaders argued that this 
exemption has the effect of limiting conscience protections to religious 
organizations “that do not reach out to the world.”11 Notre Dame 
President Fr. John Jenkins, who originally lauded President Obama’s 
2009 commencement address as a roadmap for seeking common ground 
between the Administration and the Church, subsequently outlined the 
university’s “impossible position” of either paying for “contraception and 
sterilization in violation of the Church’s moral teaching” or 
discontinuing “employee and student health care plans in violation of the 
Church’s social teaching.”12 
 
7. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the PPACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 
3, 2011); 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011); Women’s Preventive Services: 
Required Health Plan Coverage Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVS. 
ADMIN., http://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines (last visited Feb. 16, 
2013).  
8. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH § 2370, at 
570 (1994) [hereinafter CATECHISM] (‘“[E]very action which, whether in 
anticipation of the conjugal act, or in its accomplishment, or in the 
development of its natural consequences, proposes, whether as an end or as 
a means, to render procreation impossible’ is intrinsically evil.”). 
9. Joan Frawley Desmond, Obama Administration Approves Mandated 
Contraception Coverage, NATIONAL CATHOLIC REGISTER (Aug. 2, 2011), 
http://www.ncregister.com/daily-news/obama-Administration-approves-
mandated-contraception-coverage/. 
10. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130 (2011). 
11. Desmond, supra note 9.  
12. Letter from John I. Jenkins, President of the University of Notre Dame, to 
Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary of Health and Human Services (Sept. 28, 
2011) [hereinafter Jenkins Letter], available at http://president.nd.edu/ 
assets/50056/comments_from_rev_john_i_jenkins_notre_dame_3_.pdf. 
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Fr. Jenkins was not the only one concerned with the implications of 
a rule requiring religiously affiliated employers to subsidize 
contraception. Following the Administration’s announcement, Catholic 
churches across the country mobilized to fight the HHS mandate and 
draw the nation’s attention to the issue of religious liberty. On Sunday, 
January 29, 2012, priests across the country stood in their pulpits and 
read a letter from the American bishops charging the Administration 
with “[casting] aside the First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States,” and threatening civil disobedience if compelled to 
conform to the mandate.13 Recognizing that this issue transcended 
Catholic teaching and spoke to broader constitutional concerns, secular 
publications began to enter the fray and opine that the President had 
“awakened a sleeping giant” with a decision that would have dire 
political consequences.14 Others insinuated that by requiring Catholic 
institutions to purchase contraception, the Administration was pursuing 
a “re-election agenda that requires an end to freedom of religion.”15 
In response to these concerns, President Obama directed HHS to 
study solutions that would preserve the Administration’s policy on 
access to preventive care while respecting the free-exercise rights of 
religious employers.16 Subsequently, when the Administration finalized 
its interim rule on preventive care on February 10, 2012, President 
Obama announced that the HHS would initiate a further rulemaking 
procedure to modify the application of the mandate to religious 
employers.17 During this process, the Administration is extending a 
temporary enforcement safe-harbor to “non-exempt, non-profit religious 
organizations” that will be in place until the first plan year that begins 
on or after August 1, 2013.18  
 
13. Peggy Noonan, A Battle the President Can’t Win, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4-5, 
2012, at A15; Letter from Richard Lennon, Bishop of Cleveland, to the 
Diocese of Cleveland (Jan. 26, 2012) (on file with author).  
14. Noonan, supra note 13. 
15. Kevin O’Brien, Contraception or the Constitution?, THE CLEVELAND PLAIN 
DEALER, Jan. 26, 2012, at A7. 
16. Remarks on Preventive Health Care Insurance Coverage and an Exchange 
with Reporters, 2012 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 2 (Feb. 10, 2012) 
[hereinafter Remarks]. 
17. See id.; see also Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care 
Act, 77 Fed Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012) (announcing the intention of the 
Departments of Health and Human Services, Labor, and the Treasury to 
establish alternative ways to fulfill the mandate’s requirements when 
coverage is sponsored or arranged by a religious organization that is not 
exempt under the final regulations published February 15, 2012.). 
18. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
16,501, 16,503 (Mar. 21, 2012).  
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013  
Drafting a “Sensible” Conscience Clause 
358 
Notwithstanding the President’s compromise, the HHS mandate has 
continued to engender considerable legal controversy19 and may very well 
remain vulnerable to a free-exercise challenge. To understand why, it is 
necessary to review both the religious and the legal issues at stake in this 
debate. Accordingly, Part I of this note will ask whether mandated 
contraceptive coverage actually has the potential to violate an 
employer’s religious beliefs. Having concluded that compelling Catholic 
institutions to facilitate access to contraception would transgress deeply 
held religious values, Part II will assess whether the mandate’s 
requirements (as modified by the President’s February 2012 compromise) 
actually impose this burden on religious employers. 
To redress these concerns, Part III will analyze what—if any—cause 
of action these organizations have under the Supreme Court’s recent 
free-exercise decisions. As state courts applying this jurisprudence have 
shown, however, the doctrine handed down by the Court in Employment 
Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith poses an 
insuperable obstacle to free-exercise challenges against regulations like 
the HHS mandate that are facially neutral and generally applicable.  
Notwithstanding Smith, the HHS mandate’s facial neutrality and 
general applicability do not necessarily insulate it from a free-exercise 
challenge under current federal law. Accordingly, Part IV will analyze 
the mandate’s requirements in light of the Supreme Court’s 
interpretation of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA)20 in 
Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal. This Note 
will argue that, unlike the failed challenges decided under Smith, a 
challenge to the federal HHS mandate is buttressed by the Supreme 
Court’s application of the RFRA in O Centro, which upheld the RFRA’s 
compelling interest test and empowered courts to fashion individualized 
exemptions to federal laws that burden religious exercise.21  
Having concluded that the mandate’s contraception coverage 
requirement is unlikely to satisfy the RFRA’s compelling interest 
analysis, Part V will put forth the proposal that, short of repeal, the 
mandate’s exemption criteria should be broadened to provide “sensible” 
conscience protections to institutional religious employers who are 
currently placed in “an impossible position” by the mandate’s limited 
exemption. Should the Administration fail to follow this course, it is 
likely that federal courts, following the lead of the Supreme Court in O 
Centro, will create specific exemptions for as many religious institutions 
 
19. See, e.g., Michelle Bauman, Forty-Three Catholic Organizations File 
Lawsuits Against HHS Mandate, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (May 21, 2012, 
10:39 AM), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/forty-three-catholic-
organizations-file-lawsuits-against-hhs-mandate/. 
20. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. (2008). 
21. Id.; Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418 (2006).  
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that decide to challenge the mandate under the RFRA. Ultimately, this 
legal quagmire can be avoided by the implementation of a “sensible” 
conscience clause that will ensure “our health care policies are grounded 
not only in sound science, but also in clear ethics.”22 
I. Does Facilitating Access to Contraception Violate 
Bona Fide Religious Beliefs? 
Despite protests that the federal mandate impermissibly burdens the 
freedom of Catholic institutions to act in accordance with their religious 
beliefs, many Americans are at a loss as to why the nearly ubiquitous 
practice of contraception would lead to a showdown between church and 
state. On the one hand, the Catholic Church claims that facilitating 
such coverage (even for non-Catholic employees) would transgress its 
deeply held moral values. On the other hand, supporters of the mandate 
argue that ecclesiastical institutions are simply searching for a 
theological peg on which to hang an objection rooted not in moral 
conviction, but in an unwillingness to pay for valuable and necessary 
medical services.23  
A.  Whose Burden? The Economic Cost of Failing to Cover 
Contraceptive Products and Services 
From an economic perspective, any burden associated with an 
individual’s choice to use contraception does not hinder the religious 
exercise of Catholic employers; rather, it falls on the backs of cash-
strapped single women and working families who cannot afford to live 
without it. Accordingly, for those who support the Administration’s 
decision, including the numerous Catholic women who use birth control, 
the HHS mandate is “both laudable and common-sense.”24 Failing to 
enact such a measure would, in the words of former Maryland 
Lieutenant-Governor Kathleen Kennedy-Townsend, “deny a benefit to a 
whole class of workers—including hundreds of thousands of non-
Catholics—who want it, need it, and are legally entitled to it.”25  
The case is even more sympathetic for non-Catholics employed by 
Church-affiliated institutions. And although contraceptive pills, patches, 
and rings only cost up to $60 for a month’s supply, this out-of-pocket 
expense can be daunting for the estimated 11 million women of 
 
22. Obama, supra note 2. 
23. See, e.g., Kathleen Kennedy Townsend, Out of Step with the Flock: 
Bishops Far Behind on Birth Control Issues, THE ATLANTIC (Dec. 9, 2011, 
9:57 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/12/out-of-
step-with-the-flock-bishops-far-behind-on-birth-control-issues/249703/. 
24. Id. 
25. Id.  
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reproductive age who live below the poverty level.26 Even with insurance 
coverage, which typically covers only a portion of the costs associated 
with prescription contraceptives, these expenses can still constitute up to 
29 percent of a woman’s personal expenditures for health services.27 For 
these women, an inability to cover the costs associated with 
contraception often results in a decision not to use birth control.28 In 
that case, employers (and society at large) may be required to pay the 
even higher costs associated with unwanted pregnancies, miscarriages, 
and abortions.29  
According to advocates of prescription contraceptive coverage, this 
formula is a recipe for financial disaster. For a full-term pregnancy, 
medical costs can rise to $8,619, while a miscarriage or abortion will 
cost, respectively, $1,038 and $416.30 Alternatively, insurance coverage of 
contraceptives can provide significant savings for employers. Certain 
studies, for example, have shown that private employers pay less in 
medical benefits every year for each employee who receives contraceptive 
coverage.31 These findings are supported by similar trends in public 
benefit spending. According to the Guttmacher Institute, for example, 
every public dollar invested in contraception can save up to $3.74 in 
Medicaid expenditures for care related to unplanned pregnancies.32 
Additionally, it was estimated that the services performed at family 
planning clinics saved $5.1 billion in 2008.33 With these economic  
26. Adam Sonfield, The Case for Insurance Coverage of Contraceptive Services 
and Supplies Without Cost Sharing, 14 GUTTMACHER POLICY REV. 7, 9 
(2011); GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, TESTIMONY OF GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE 
SUBMITTED TO COMMITTEE ON PREVENTIVE SERVICES FOR WOMEN 
INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE 7 (2011) [hereinafter GUTTMACHER TESTIMONY], 
available at http://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/CPSW-testimony.pdf. 
27. GUTTMACHER TESTIMONY, supra note 26, at 8. 
28. Health-Care Law Holds Tremendous Promise for Women’s Reproductive-
Health Care, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA 3 (Jan. 1, 2012), 
http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/birth-control-healthy-
pregnancies-affordable-care-act.pdf; Christopher G. Kuhn, An EPICC 
Oversight: Why the Current Battle for Access to Contraception Will Not 
Help Reduce Unintended Pregnancy in the U.S., 17 HEALTH MATRIX 347, 
352 (2007). 
29. Insurance Coverage for Contraception: A Proven Way to Protect and 
Promote Women’s Health, NARAL PRO-CHOICE AMERICA FOUNDATION 2 
(Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/birth-
control-insurance-coverage.pdf. 
30. Id. 
31. See, e.g., Promoting Healthy Pregnancies: Counseling and Contraception 
as the First Step, WASH. BUS. GROUP ON HEALTH 8  
(Sept. 20, 2000), http://www.businessgrouphealth.org/pdfs/healthy 
pregnancy.pdf.  
32. Sonfield, supra note 26, at 10.  
33. Id. 
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benefits in mind, it is undoubtedly in an employer’s best financial 
interests to cover the costs of employees’ birth control and, in doing so, 
reduce its own expenses and the number of  
unwanted pregnancies that may end in abortion.  
Advocates of mandated prescription contraceptive coverage also 
point to the more intangible benefits that birth control can provide for 
women in contemporary society. In promulgating its final rule, HHS 
noted that access to contraception improves the social and economic 
status of women by giving them the option to participate more fully in 
economic and political life.34 Because women use birth control more than 
men, however, these benefits are often overshadowed by the out-of-
pocket costs that are unique to female preventive care. In the judgment 
of the Administration, providing such care without cost-sharing is one 
way to level the playing field for men and women by reducing sex-
specific healthcare costs.35  
Accordingly, if the federal birth control mandate benefits employers 
by reducing long-term health care costs, does not require anyone to use 
birth control, and simply makes it more affordable for those who do, 
how can Catholic institutions claim that the federal government is 
substantially burdening their free-exercise rights? 
B.  Catholic Teaching on Artificial Contraception 
While it is undoubtedly clear that an employer’s best economic 
interests mitigate in favor of making contraception more readily 
available, Catholic institutions have insisted that facilitating the use of 
these products and services will impermissibly burden their free exercise 
of religion.36 To understand the gravity of the Church’s concerns, and 
whether or not they are actually implicated by the revised rule, it is 
necessary to understand the Church’s moral position with regard to both 
using contraception and cooperating in its procurement.  
While many Christian and non-Christian religions condemn extra-
marital sex, homosexual acts, masturbation, pornography, and 
polygamy, the Catholic Church remains the only mainstream religious 
body to condemn contraception as “intrinsically evil.”37 This teaching 
has its roots in both the Bible and the teachings of early church fathers 
like Augustine of Hippo, who taught that “[t]hey who resort to 
[contraceptives], although called by the name of spouses, are really not 
 
34. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage 
of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. 
pt. 147).  
35. Id. 
36. See Desmond, supra note 9.  
37. CATECHISM, supra note 8, § 2370, at 570. 
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such; they retain no vestige of true matrimony, but pretend the 
honourable designation as a cloak for criminal conduct.”38 
Today, the Church presents its teaching on artificial contraception 
as part of a holistic understanding of human sexuality that respects both 
the unitive and the procreative aspects of the marital act. Sexual 
intercourse is procreative in the sense that its natural, biological end is 
the creation of new life. Furthermore, sexual activity is unitive insofar as 
it forges an intimate bond between a man and a woman that brings the 
two together in order to ensure the proper care, upbringing, and 
education of that young life. By frustrating either end of the sexual 
act—the unitive or the procreative—the Church teaches that a couple 
acts contrary to God’s will as it has been revealed to man by natural 
law.39 
The HHS mandate, however, encompasses more than just pregnancy-
preventing drugs. It covers the full range of FDA-approved contraceptive 
services and products, including the morning-after pill.40 These drugs 
operate post-conception to inhibit the implantation of an embryo, 
“blur[ring] the line between birth control and abortion.”41 Because 
Catholic belief holds that life begins at the moment of conception,42 the 
compelled subsidization of these products by Catholic institutions would 
force them to participate in a practice that the Second Vatican Council 
denounced as an “unspeakable crime.”43 
From the Church’s perspective, the only morally acceptable form of 
birth control is natural family planning—the practice by which 
 
38. AUGUSTINE, 1 ON MARRIAGE AND CONCUPISCENCE—WHAT IS SINLESS  
IN THE USE OF MATRIMONY? WHAT IS ATTENDED WITH VENIAL  
SIN, AND WHAT WITH MORTAL? (419), available at http://www.ccel.org/ 
ccel/schaff/npnf105.xvi.v.xvii.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
39. PAUL VI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER HUMANAE VITAE, paras. 12-13: AAS 60 
(1968), available at http://www.catholicsociety.com/documents/ 
paul_vi/Humanae_vitae.pdf; see Genesis 38:9–10; Deuteronomy 23:1. 
40. See Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage 
of Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care 
Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
147) (requiring coverage, without cost-sharing, for all FDA approved 
contraceptive methods); see also Birth Control Guide, FDA, 
http://www.fda.gov/forconsumers/byaudience/forwomen/ucm118 465.htm 
(last visited Feb. 17, 2013) (listing the “morning after pill” as an FDA 
approved contraceptive).  
41. Susan J. Stabile, State Attempts to Define Religion: The Ramifications of 
Applying Mandatory Prescription Contraceptive Coverage Statutes to 
Religious Employers, 28 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 741, 753 (2005). 
42. CATECHISM, supra note 8, § 2270, at 547.  
43. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, GAUDIUM ET SPES, para. 51 (1965), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/docum 
ents/vat-ii_const_19651207_gaudium-et-spes_en.html; CATECHISM, supra 
note 8, §§ 2270-2272, at 547-48.  
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013  
Drafting a “Sensible” Conscience Clause 
363 
intercourse is relegated to the infertile periods of a woman’s reproductive 
cycle. Because this practice acts in conformity with (and not against) 
nature, its use has been sanctioned by the Church as a means by which 
couples may regulate pregnancy.44 
The Church’s moral concerns, however, are not limited to the 
immediate act of using artificial contraception. Writing on the issue in 
1968, Pope Paul VI predicted that the widespread use of prophylactics 
would “open wide the way for marital infidelity and a general lowering 
of moral standards.”45 Before his ascension to the papacy, Benedict XVI 
also reflected that the disassociation of sexuality from procreation would 
render all sexual acts equal, allowing man to express his sexual desires in 
any way he sees fit.46 This, of course, would remove any moral 
opprobrium from pornography, prostitution, and other behaviors 
condemned by the Church as acts of sexual vice. With these principles in 
mind, the Catholic Church’s teaching on contraception cannot be 
considered as a stand-alone issue. Rather, it lies at the root of the 
Church’s much more expansive and foundational teaching on the 
sanctity of human life, which, according to Pope John Paul II, must be 
“defended with maximum determination.”47  
While the Church teaches that the guilt of sin is normally incurred 
by individual behavior, it also forbids actions that, while not specifically 
sinful, lend “material cooperation” to morally dubious conduct.48 This 
cooperation may be formal or material.49 Formal cooperation occurs 
when one takes part in the sinful act of another and thus shares the 
principal’s intent to commit the offense in question.50 Material 
cooperation, on the other hand, does not involve sinful intent. Rather, it 
occurs when one gives assistance to another’s sin by an act that is in and 
of itself not morally wrong.51 Such material cooperation may be 
immediate or mediate.52 One gives immediate material cooperation to the 
 
44. PAUL VI, supra note 39, at paras. 15-16. 
45. Id. at para. 17. 
46. JOSEPH CARDINAL RATZINGER WITH VITTORIO MESSORI, THE RATZINGER 
REPORT 85 (Salvatore Attanasio & Graham Harrison trans., 1985). 
47. JOHN PAUL II, CHRISTIFIDELES LAICI: THE VOCATION AND THE MISSION OF 
THE LAY FAITHFUL IN THE CHURCH AND IN THE WORLD sec. 38, at 108 
(1988).  
48. CATECHISM, supra note 8, § 1868, at 457 (“[W]e have a responsibility for 
the sins committed by others when we cooperate in them . . . .”) (emphasis 
in original).  
49. THOMAS J. HIGGINS, MAN AS MAN: THE SCIENCE AND ART OF ETHICS 341 
(The Bruce Publishing Co. rev. ed. 1958).  
50. Id. 
51. Id.  
52. Id. at 342. 
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sin of another when he or she takes part in the other’s sinful act—albeit 
the cooperator does not share the mens rea of the principal.53 Mediate 
material cooperation, on the other hand, occurs when one performs an 
act that is “preparatory to another’s sin.”54 Accordingly, the Church 
would consider facilitating access to contraception to be at least mediate 
material cooperation because it facilitates conduct that is inherently 
sinful. Theologians, however, have argued that the HHS mandate 
actually threatens Catholic employers with immediate material 
cooperation in evil, as they would be paying for health plans that 
provide direct access to “free” contraception.55 
Because the guilt of sin may be imputed to actions that pave the 
way for wrongdoing, the Church teaches that even mediate material 
cooperation in evil should be avoided whenever possible.56 Immediate 
material cooperation, on the other hand, is “never legitimate.”57 Because 
the HHS mandate would compel employers to facilitate access to 
contraception, objecting religious institutions would necessarily have to 
choose between following the law (and materially cooperating in sin) or 
discontinuing employee health benefits.58 By forcing a religious employer 
to make such a decision in order to comply with the law, however, the 
requirements of the HHS mandate may very well constitute a 
“substantial burden” on the free exercise of religion.59 
 
53. Id. (explaining that immediate material cooperation, albeit without sinful 
intent, occurs when one plays an active role in another’s wrong). An 
example is an individual assisting in a robbery because she was threatened 
with death. The individual is providing immediate material cooperation to 
the sinner, but her cooperation would not be considered intrinsically wrong 
because she was acting under duress. 
54. Id. 
55. Benjamin Mann, Moral Theologians Reject Catholic Writer’s Defense of 
HHS Mandate, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 16, 2012, 11:07 AM), 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/moral-theologians-reject-
catholic-writers-defense-of-hhs-mandate/. 
56. HIGGINS, supra note 48, at 341 (“The general law of morality is that man 
must avoid evil as far as he can and the specific law of charity bids him to 
prevent his neighbor from doing wrong to the best of his ability . . . but at 
times the principle of double effect may be applied. Since the material co-
operator does not intend the evil of the principal’s act, whenever his own 
act is good or indifferent and he has a proportionately grave reason for 
acting, his co-operation will be licit.”). 
57. Mann, supra note 55.  
58. See Jenkins Letter, supra note 12 (outlining the University of Notre 
Dame’s position of either paying for contraceptives in violation of the 
Church’s moral teaching or discontinuing employee and student health 
plans in violation of the Church’s social teaching). 
59. See Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Employment Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 
718 (1981) (defining a substantial burden as one that “put[s] substantial 
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.”); 
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II. Does the HHS Mandate Require Catholic 
Employers to Violate Their Religious Beliefs? 
On February 15, 2012, the interim final rule requiring that all health 
plans and health insurance issuers provide contraceptive services with no 
cost-sharing was finalized “without change.”60 Even so, the 
Administration announced that it will work with religious employers 
over a one-year period to “find an equitable solution that protects 
religious liberty and ensures that every woman has access to the care 
that she needs.”61 During this process, the Administration is extending a 
temporary enforcement safe-harbor to “non-exempt, non-profit religious 
organizations” that will be in place until the first plan year that begins 
on or after August 1, 2013.62  
While these proposed accommodations do not yet have the force of 
law, the Administration has initiated a rulemaking procedure during the 
temporary enforcement safe-harbor to modify the manner in which the 
HHS mandate is applied to non-exempt religious employers.63 The 
proposed modifications will require insurance companies to offer 
insurance without contraceptive coverage to objecting institutions and 
simultaneously offer contraceptives to those institutions’ employees 
without cost-sharing.64 A similar (but yet-to-be defined) provision will 
 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (burden is substantial if it 
forces a person to “choose between following the precepts of her religion 
and forfeiting [governmental] benefits, on the one hand, and abandoning 
one of the precepts of her religion . . . on the other hand.”). Many of the 
Circuits have articulated definitions of “substantial burden” consistent 
with this example. See, e.g., Adkins v. Kaspar, 393 F.3d 559, 570 (5th Cir. 
2004) (defining a substantial burden as one that “truly pressures the 
adherent to significantly modify his religious behavior and significantly 
violate his religious beliefs”); Midrash Sephardi, Inc. v. Town of Surfside, 
366 F.3d 1214, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (stating that a substantial burden can 
“result from pressure that tends to force adherents to forego religious  
precepts . . . .”). 
60. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147). 
61. Remarks, supra note 16. 
62. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
16,501 16,503 (Mar. 21, 2012).  
63. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
147); Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. 
Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012). 
64. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
16,501, 16,505-06 (“This means that contraceptive coverage would not be 
included in the plan document, contract, or premium charged to the 
religious organization. Instead, the issuer would be required to provide 
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also be implemented for non-exempt religious employers who self-
insure.65  
In promulgating its decision to accommodate the concerns of 
religious employers, the Administration asked that insurers, who will be 
required to provide contraceptive coverage directly to the employees of 
objecting institutions, offer such services free of charge.66 This decision 
was based on studies showing that contraceptive coverage is at least 
cost-neutral after factoring in the savings generated by a reduction in 
pregnancies and related pre-natal care.67 Accordingly, the Administration 
expects that “issuers would pay for contraceptive coverage from the 
elimination of the need to pay for services that would otherwise be used 
if contraceptives were not covered.”68 Specifically, while actuarial firms 
have found that the cost of adding prescription contraceptives to 
employee health plans is about $26 per enrolled woman, these costs are 
effectively mitigated by savings that can add up to $97 annually per 
employee.69  
Despite the claims that providing contraceptive coverage is “cost 
saving,”70 recent studies have shown that providers who are compelled to 
offer these services free of charge may have to pass costs down to their 
customers, including religious employers. One nation-wide survey of 
pharmacy directors, for example, revealed that none of the respondents 
believed mandated contraception coverage would reduce overall costs by 
limiting unplanned pregnancies.71 One pharmacy director even went so 
far as to remark that “[w]hen mandates are put in place, organizations 
 
participants and beneficiaries covered under the plan separate coverage for 
contraceptive services . . . without cost sharing.”). 
65. Id. at 16,506.  
66. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
147) (“Under this approach, the Departments will also require that, in this 
circumstance, there be no charge for the contraceptive coverage.”).  
67. Id.; see also JOHN BERTKO ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
THE COST OF COVERING CONTRACEPTIVES THROUGH HEALTH INSURANCE 
(2012). 
68. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
16,501, 16,506 (Mar. 21, 2012). 
69. BERTKO ET AL., supra note 67.  
70. Id. 
71. REIMBURSEMENT INTELLIGENCE, PAYER SURVEY: CURRENT CONTRACEPTION 
BENEFIT STRUCTURE AND ANTICIPATED IMPACT OF MANDATED NO-COST 
ACCESS FOR ALL MEMBERS 3 (2012). 
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have an opportunity and need to raise prices, change cost structures, and 
pass along additional costs to our customers.”72  
Harvard University economics professor Greg Mankiw has also 
concluded that any change for religious employers under the modified 
rule is simply a matter of semantics.73 Because all insurance costs will be 
passed on to a religious employer through its premiums, and those 
insurance costs will necessarily include the “free” contraceptives that the 
insurer must offer to a religious institution’s employees (without 
imposing any cost on them), the employer will inevitably have to pick 
up the tab.74 These findings have reinforced concerns that despite the 
President’s compromise, religious employers will still be compelled to 
subsidize contraception by bearing the substantial, albeit less visible, 
burden of “free” birth control coverage through their premiums.75 
Accordingly, Church leaders have warned that the Administration’s offer 
to exclude contraceptives from religious employer health plans is 
“illusory” because under the revised rule, “[e]veryone doing business with 
insurance companies—employers and employees alike—[will] be paying 
for [contraception].”76  
Even if objecting religious employers were in no position to 
financially subsidize contraceptives, religious liberty advocates have 
argued that the Administration’s proposed accommodation still presents 
them with the moral dilemma of “triggering” access to sinful products 
and services.77 According to this argument, even though an employer 
may not be required to directly purchase birth control, the fact that it 
offers any plan to its employees means that participants and 
beneficiaries will simultaneously receive access to “free” contraception 
via the employer’s insurer as a benefit of employment.  
This is not an argument about some speculative future harm. 
Rather, it is what the HHS mandate actually requires all non-exempt 
 
72. REIMBURSEMENT INTELLIGENCE, PAYERS SAY BIRTH CONTROL MANDATE 
WILL INCREASE PREMIUMS (Feb. 17, 2012), available at 
http://reimbursementintelligence.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/ 
Contraceptive-Press-Release_FINAL1.pdf. 
73. Greg Mankiw, Semantics at the Highest Level, GREG MANKIW’S BLOG (Feb. 
11, 2010), http://gregmankiw.blogspot.com/2012/02/semantics-at-highest-
level.html. 
74. See id. 
75. Michelle Bauman, Insurers Do Not Believe Contraception Mandate Will 
Cut Costs, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 22, 2012, 2:24 AM), 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/insurers-do-not-believe-
contraception-mandate-will-cut-costs/.  
76. Mann, supra note 55.  
77. Mark Rienzi, ROLL CALL: Nothing Changes with Obama’s Birth Control 
Compromise, BECKET FUND FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.becketfund.org/nothing-changes-with-obamas-birth-control-
compromise/. 
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religious employers to do.78 By simply offering healthcare benefits, an 
employer is ensuring that its employees will receive “free” access to birth 
control through that employer’s insurer, even if the contraceptives are 
not “directly” covered under the employer’s plan. While it may be 
argued that simply paying employees also “triggers” access to morally 
objectionable products and services, it must be noted that each employee 
chooses what to do with the money she earns. Up until now, religious 
employers were also able to choose what to offer their employees with 
regard to health insurance and benefits. The ability to make this choice 
led many Catholic institutions to exclude contraceptive coverage from 
their employee benefit plans.79 Under the HHS mandate, however, any 
religious employer that offers health insurance to its employees will, by 
default, have no choice about whether their insurance provider will offer 
employees, as a benefit of their employment, contraceptives and 
abortion-inducing drugs. Accordingly, the President’s proposed 
compromise “changes nothing of the moral substance” behind religious 
employers’ objections because they will still have to provide and pay for 
insurance that, one way or another, covers products that they object 
to.80  
Because such activity would directly facilitate the sin of another, a 
Catholic employer cannot, in good conscience, comply with the 
mandate.81 The only way around this dilemma is to try to fit within the 
mandate’s narrow “religious employer” exemption (by only hiring and 
serving co-religionists) or to cease providing health benefits altogether. 
Far from solving the employer’s problem, however, these solutions would 
either force the organization out of the public sphere or lead to 
substantial fines and penalties under the ACA.82  
 
78. Certain Preventive Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 
16,501, 16,506 (Mar. 21, 2012) (requiring insurance issuers to provide 
contraceptive coverage to participants and beneficiaries covered under a 
religious employer’s plan).  
79. Louise Radnofsky, Schools Navigate State Birth-Control Patchwork, WALL 
ST. J., Mar. 1, 2012, at A2 (noting that even when faced with state-level 
contraceptive coverage requirements, Catholic institutions were able to 
avoid covering contraceptives by moving to self-insured plans, which are 
regulated by the federal government and not the states. Under the HHS 
mandate, however, these institutions can no longer avoid providing 
contraceptive coverage through their insurance plans.). 
80. Open letter from John Garvey, President of the Catholic University of 
America, et al. (Feb. 23, 2012) [hereinafter Garvey Letter], available at 
http://www.becketfund.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Unacceptable-2-
23-6pm.pdf. 
81. For a discussion on the doctrine of material cooperation, see supra Part 
I.B.  
82. The ACA does not require employers to provide health insurance coverage 
for their employees. If, however, an employer retains fifty or more full time 
employees and any of these employees have to obtain insurance through an 
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Supporters of the President’s compromise have argued that indirect 
cooperation with morally questionable behavior can hardly amount to a 
religious burden when it is practically unavoidable in a modern, 
interconnected economy.83 An individual’s tax contributions, for 
example, may very well go to fund government activities that he or she 
considers to be immoral. In response, religious leaders have clarified that 
this issue is not analogous to what the government chooses to do with its 
resources. Rather, it is about whether religious employers have “the 
freedom in their own right not to facilitate something that violates the 
tenets of their own faith.”84 Formerly, these institutions would have had 
the freedom to exclude coverage for products or services they deemed to 
be immoral. Now, however, any religious employer offering health 
insurance is placed in the position of extending to its employees, through 
its insurance provider, the “free benefit” of contraceptives and abortion-
inducing drugs.85 The fundamental question that courts will have to 
address is whether any of these concerns actually burden a religiously 
affiliated employer’s free exercise of religion. To that extent, it will be 
necessary to review applicable free-exercise law under both the First 
Amendment and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act. 
 
Exchange because the employer does not offer insurance or it is not 
“affordable,” the employer will face financial penalties beginning in 2014. 
Should a Catholic institution with at least fifty employees choose not to 
offer health coverage due to the contraceptive mandate, it would be subject 
to these penalties if and when its employees sought alternative insurance 
through an  
Exchange. HINDA CHAIKIND & CHRIS L. PETERSON, SUMMARY OF 
POTENTIAL EMPLOYER PENALTIES UNDER PPACA (P.L. 111-148) 1, 3 
(2010), available at http://www.ltgov.ri.gov/smallbusiness/employer 
provisions.pdf.  
83. David Gibson, Contraception Objections Fail Catholic’s Moral Reasoning, 
USA TODAY (Feb. 14, 2012, 6:14 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/ 
news/religion/story/2012-02-14/catholic-bishop-morals-birth-control-
contraception/53095538/1.  
84. Conscience, Not Contraception, AMERICAN ASSOCIATION OF PRO- 
LIFE OBSTETRICIANS AND GYNECOLOGISTS (Feb. 16, 2012), 
http://www.aaplog.org/get-involved/letters-to-members/conscience-not-
contraception/ (quoting testimony of Rabbi Meir Soloveichik before the 
House Oversight and Government Reform Committee on Feb. 16, 2012).  
85. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
147) (requiring that while a religious employer may be offered a policy that 
excludes contraception, their insurer shall simultaneously offer the 
employees of that institution any FDA-approved contraceptive drug or 
service free of charge). 
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III. Mandated Prescription Contraceptive Coverage 
and the Supreme Court’s Free-Exercise Jurisprudence  
If the HHS mandate threatens to burden the free-exercise rights of 
religious employers, it must satisfy the limitations placed on government 
entanglement in religious belief and practice articulated in the Bill of 
Rights. The First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States 
provides that “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment 
of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.”86 To date, at least 
one judge has gone so far as to describe the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions interpreting the First Amendment’s religion clauses as 
“whimsical” and “somewhat erratic.”87 Given the capricious nature of the 
Court’s free-exercise decisions over the past half century, such a criticism 
is not without merit.  
A.  The Supreme Court’s “Whimsical” and “Erratic” Free-Exercise 
Jurisprudence—From Sherbert to Lukumi 
From 1963 until 1990, the Supreme Court construed the Free-
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to require that any law 
burdening religious exercise either directly or indirectly must be (1) 
justified by a compelling state interest and (2) narrowly tailored to 
satisfy that interest.88 This balancing test outlined by the Court in 
Sherbert v. Verner was subsequently rejected by the majority in 
Employment Division v. Smith.89 In Smith, two members of the Native 
American Church were denied unemployment benefits because they were 
fired for smoking peyote, which was deemed to constitute work-related 
misconduct.90 Because their peyote use took place in the context of a 
Native American religious ceremony, the employees brought suit to 
challenge their denial of benefits as a violation of the Free-exercise 
Clause.91 Finding against them, the majority held that “an individual’s 
religious beliefs” do not ”excuse him from compliance with an otherwise 
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regulate.”92 If not, 
the Court feared, individuals would use their religious beliefs as a basis 
for non-compliance with valid state laws regulating public health, safety, 
 
86. U.S. CONST. amend. I.  
87. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 98 
(Cal. 2004) (Brown, J., dissenting).  
88. See Sherbert v. Verner, 347 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). 
89. See Employment Division, Dep’t of Human Res. of Oregon v. Smith, 494 
U.S. 872, 885 (1990). 
90. Id. at 874. 
91. Id. 
92. Id. at 878-79.  
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and welfare.93 Accordingly, the Smith Court concluded that if a law is 
facially neutral and generally applicable, the First Amendment does not 
“relieve an individual of the obligation to comply.”94  
The product of a divided Court, the Smith decision was roundly 
criticized by the dissenting justices. Justice O’Connor, for example, 
lamented how “today’s holding dramatically departs from well-settled 
First Amendment jurisprudence, appears unnecessary to resolve the 
question presented, and is incompatible with our Nation’s fundamental 
commitment to individual religious liberty.”95 Justice Blackmun’s 
dissent, which was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, also 
suggested that the majority’s opinion was an overreaction and would 
have dire consequences for the First Amendment.96  
Three years later, in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City 
of Hialeah, the Court fused Smith with Sherbert to create a new, two-
part test for analyzing free-exercise claims.97 Henceforth, in order to 
prevail on a free-exercise claim, a plaintiff would have to show that a 
challenged law is (1) not neutral and generally applicable, per Smith, 
and is (2) not narrowly tailored to further a compelling state interest, as 
defined in Sherbert.98 Nevertheless, even after Lukumi, Smith remained 
the operative test for Free-Exercise cases because a showing that a 
challenged law is generally applicable and facially neutral will preclude 
any inquiry into the state’s compelling interest under Sherbert.  
B. Unsuccessful Challenges to State Contraceptive Mandates  
Under Smith 
Concerned with the implications of the Supreme Court’s holding in 
Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) 
in 1993 to restore Sherbert’s strict scrutiny analysis of laws burdening 
religious exercise.99 The RFRA was subsequently held unconstitutional as 
applied against state governments in City of Bourne v. Flores.100 
Accordingly, free-exercise challenges brought by religious employers in 
response to state contraceptive coverage laws predating the HHS 
 
93. Id. at 879. 
94. Id.  
95. Id. at 891 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
96. Id. at 908 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).  
97. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 
(1993). 
98. Id. at 531-32.  
99. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb(a)(2)-(b)(1) 
(2008). 
100. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 507-08 (1997). For a detailed 
discussion of the RFRA and the Supreme Court’s application of the law to 
both the states and the federal government, see infra Part III.A.  
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mandate have been evaluated under Smith’s facial neutrality and general 
applicability test. As the two cases below will demonstrate, Smith has 
posed “an insuperable obstacle” to the free-exercise claims of religious 
employers who have sought to be exempted from mandated 
contraceptive coverage.101 
In a lengthy opinion, the Supreme Court of California applied Smith 
to uphold the State’s prescription contraception coverage law in Catholic 
Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court.102 There, Sacramento’s 
Catholic Charities challenged the California Women’s Contraceptive 
Equity Act on the grounds that it violated the religion clauses of both 
the federal and the state constitutions.103 Significantly, the court noted 
that Smith “would at first glance appear to dispose of [the plaintiff’s] 
free exercise claim.”104 Because the Act’s requirements applied neutrally 
and generally to all employers (regardless of religious affiliation), the 
court found that they did not target religious practice without advancing 
a legitimate secular interest.105 As such, the Act satisfied Smith’s 
requirement that a valid law, in addition to being generally applicable, 
also be “neutral” toward religion. Any perceived antipathy toward 
Catholicism, the court noted, was not the result of the mandate itself, 
but of its narrowly tailored exemption which, although it failed to 
include many Catholic institutions, was a proper exercise of legislative 
discretion.106 Just because the exemption did not encompass all Catholic 
organizations, the court reasoned, did not mean that the law was drafted 
as an attack on the Catholic Church.107  
The New York Court of Appeals closely followed the reasoning of 
the California Supreme Court when it ruled on a similar challenge 
brought against New York’s contraceptive coverage mandate. In Catholic 
Charities of the Diocese of Albany v. Serio, the plaintiffs challenged the 
exemption for religious employers codified in New York’s Women’s 
Health and Wellness Act (WHWA) as “unconstitutionally narrow.”108 
 
101. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 465 (N.Y. 
2006).  
102. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 98 
(Cal. 2004).  
103. The California Women’s Contraceptive Equity Act includes a provision in 
the California Health and Safety Code and a provision in the California 
Insurance Code. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE  
§ 1367.25 (West 2005); CAL. INS. CODE § 10123.196 (West 2005). 
104. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 82.  
105. Id. at 82-84. 
106. Id. at 83-84. 
107. Id. at 84-85.  
108. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 N.E.2d 459, 462 (N.Y. 
2006). 
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This statute employed the same exemption that is codified in 
California’s Women’s Contraceptive Equity Act and currently codified in 
the HHS mandate.109 Applying the Supreme Court’s decisions in Smith 
and Lukumi, the New York court held that “the First Amendment has 
not been offended.”110 Specifically, the court looked to the legislature’s 
intent in passing the WHWA to conclude that it was passed “to 
eliminate disparities between men and women in the cost of health care,” 
and hence, “[r]eligious beliefs were not the ‘target’ of the WHWA”; it 
was “not that law’s ‘object’ to interfere with plaintiffs’ or anyone’s 
exercise of religion.”111 As such, the law passed muster as a “neutral law 
of general applicability” capable of withstanding a free-exercise challenge 
under Smith.  
Given the similarity of the federal HHS mandate to these state-level 
regulations, it is likely that a court considering a First Amendment 
challenge from religious employers would also follow Smith and rule in 
favor of the government. This failure to move beyond the question of a 
law’s objective neutrality, however, would preclude a court from 
answering important questions about whether a generally applicable, 
facially neutral law can nevertheless impose a significant burden on 
religious exercise. To redress these concerns, it will be necessary for 
religious employers to attack the HHS mandate through a legal venue 
that subjects the government’s case to a higher level of judicial scrutiny.  
IV. The Federal Contraceptive Coverage Mandate in 
Light of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
A.  Congress’s Response to Smith: The Religious Freedom  
Restoration Act 
As the New York Court of Appeals noted in Catholic Charities of 
Diocese of Albany, “Smith is an insuperable obstacle” to religious 
employers challenging a facially neutral, generally applicable 
contraceptive-coverage mandate.112 Recognizing that Smith “virtually 
eliminated the requirement that the government justify burdens on 
religious exercise imposed by laws neutral toward religion,” Congress 
acted to redress this imbalance in federal free-exercise jurisprudence by 
passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act in 1993.113  
Importantly, Congress recognized that “laws ‘neutral’ toward 
religion may burden religious exercise as surely as laws intended to 
 
109. See supra notes 9-10 (summarizing the exemption’s provisions).  
110. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany, 859 N.E.2d at 464.  
111. Id.  
112. Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany, 859 N.E.2d at 465.  
113. Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(a)(4), (b)(1) 
(2008).  
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interfere with religious exercise.”114 After Smith, however, the burdens 
imposed on religious belief and practice by generally applicable, facially 
neutral laws could not be redressed by the courts. Nevertheless, Congress 
concluded that “the compelling interest test as set forth in prior Federal 
court rulings is a workable test for striking sensible balances between 
religious liberty and competing . . . governmental interests.”115  
Accordingly, the RFRA sought to restore the strict-scrutiny analysis 
laid down in Sherbert by requiring that “the government shall not 
substantially burden a person’s exercise of religion even if the burden 
results from a rule of general applicability” unless it “is in furtherance of 
a compelling governmental interest” and “is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”116 The RFRA also 
provides a vehicle for obtaining “appropriate relief against a 
government” by “a person whose religious exercise has been burdened in 
violation of [the Act].”117  
In City of Boerne v. Flores, the Supreme Court invalidated the 
RFRA as it applied against the states on the grounds that it exceeded 
Congress’ power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment.118 Nevertheless, 
the Act has been applied to federal law as a valid exercise of Congress’ 
Article I enforcement power. In Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, the Supreme Court applied the RFRA to 
the case of a religious sect that sought an exemption from the Controlled 
Substances Act in order to use a hallucinogenic tea (hoasca) in its 
rituals.119 Finding that the RFRA contemplated that the courts would 
create exemptions to generally-applicable federal laws in order to relieve 
the free-exercise burdens on individual claimants, the majority held that 
the government failed to demonstrate a compelling interest for 
prohibiting plaintiffs’ religious use of hoasca.120 Significantly, the Court 
recognized that an analysis under the RFRA would have to be context-
specific and tailored to the government’s interest in burdening the 
religious exercise of each specific plaintiff.121 As such, the justices ruled 
that it was not enough for the government to simply assert a general 
interest in the uniform application of the Controlled Substances Act.122 
 
114. § 2000bb(a)(2). 
115. § 2000bb(a)(5). 
116. §§ 2000bb-1(a)-(b). 
117. § 2000bb-1(c). 
118. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
119. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
439 (2006).  
120. Id. at 434, 439. 
121. Id. at 430-31. 
122. Id. at 435. 
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Rather, any law challenged under the RFRA must withstand a 
compelling interest analysis that is tailored to both the plaintiff’s 
individual religious obligations and the government’s interest in 
burdening those obligations in each case.  
B.  Preliminary Showings Required by the RFRA 
Before a court can assess whether or not a federal law satisfies the 
compelling interest test laid down in the RFRA, a claimant must first 
show that his religious exercise has been substantially burdened. As a 
threshold matter, a plaintiff may be required to articulate the scope of 
his beliefs, show that these beliefs are indeed religious, and prove that 
they are sincerely held.123 If he can then show that these beliefs have 
been substantially burdened, the government must demonstrate that the 
regulation or practice at issue furthers a compelling interest and employs 
the least restrictive means of doing so.124  
As discussed in Part I above, the Catholic Church has consistently 
condemned the use of contraception as an unnatural  
sexual practice that renders one guilty of grave sin.125 Accordingly, 
Catholic employers who accept this teaching cannot materially  
cooperate in the sin of another by facilitating direct access to  
contraceptive products and services through their insurance plans.126 
Even though many Catholics do not consider this to be an obligatory or 
central teaching of their faith, the RFRA protects “any exercise  
of religion”127 and does not “focus . . . on the centrality of the  
particular activity to the adherent’s religion but rather  
on . . . whether the adherent’s sincere religious exercise is substantially 
burdened.”128  
When considering whether a Catholic institution’s religious exercise 
would be “significantly burdened” by the HHS mandate, it will be 
helpful to review the definitions and principles used by courts who have 
considered similar questions in the past. Although the “RFRA does not 
explain what constitutes a ‘substantial burden’ on the exercise of 
religion,” many courts have derived a useful definition from the Supreme 
 
123. United States v. Zimmerman, 514 F.3d 851, 853 (9th Cir. 2007). 
124. Adams v. Comm’r, 170 F.3d 173, 176 (3d Cir. 1999). 
125. See supra Part I.B. Courts analyzing RFRA claims frequently consider 
whether a religious practice is mandated or merely encouraged by a 
particular faith. See, e.g., Turner-Bey v. Lee, 935 F. Supp. 702, 703 (D. 
Md. 1996). In this case, contraception has been unambiguously condemned 
by the Church, and Catholics are prohibited from using it under pain of 
mortal sin. CATECHISM, supra note 8, § 2370, at 570. 
126. See supra Part I.B.  
127. Protection of Religious Exercise in Land Use and By Institutionalized 
Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(a) (2008). 
128. Kaemmerling v. Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2008). 
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Court’s pre-Smith decisions.129 Accordingly, a government regulation 
may run afoul of the RFRA if it “put[s] substantial pressure on an 
adherent to modify [her] behavior and to violate [her] beliefs” or “forces 
an individual to choose between following the precepts of her religion 
and forfeiting benefits . . . and abandoning one of the precepts of her 
religion.”130 Courts have also recognized that a substantial burden exists 
when a law “forces adherents of a religion to refrain from religiously 
motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that 
manifests a central tenet of a person’s religious beliefs, or compels 
conduct or expression that is contrary to those beliefs.”131 Most recently, 
the Supreme Court’s opinion on the constitutionality of the ACA has 
made it clear that a federal mandate to purchase a product would not 
pass constitutional muster if it abridged the First Amendment’s 
guarantee of religious liberty.132 
Here, a case can be made that the HHS mandate will force a 
religious employer to engage in conduct contrary to her beliefs by 
compelling her to purchase a health insurance plan that provides free 
access to contraceptives and abortion-inducing drugs. As discussed 
above,133 a government mandate that extends, through an employer’s 
insurer, contraceptives and abortion-inducing drugs to all employees “no 
matter where [they] work”134 would render any Catholic employer who 
offers health insurance a material cooperator in sin, albeit an unwilling 
one.135 Prior to this mandate, Church-affiliated institutions were free to 
limit their coverage so that employees who wanted contraception would 
have had to purchase it using their own funds and through a source 
unaffiliated with their employer.136 Now, a religious institution will have  
129. United States v. Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of the Religious Soc’y of 
Friends, 322 F. Supp. 2d 603, 608 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
130. Id. 
131. Mack v. O’Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996); see Gibson v. 
Babbitt, 72 F. Supp. 2d 1356, 1359 (S.D. Fla. 1999), aff’d, 223 F.3d 1256 
(11th Cir. 2000). 
132. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2624 (2012) 
(Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“A mandate to 
purchase a particular product would be unconstitutional if, for example, 
the edict impermissibly abridged the freedom of speech, interfered with the 
free exercise of religion, or infringed on a liberty interest protected by the 
Due Process Clause.”). 
133. See supra Part II.  
134. Remarks, supra note 16.  
135. See Mann, supra note 55 (acknowledging the argument that a religious 
employer “‘might not have involvement or knowledge of a separate 
contract . . . between employee and insurer’ to receive contraception 
without a co-pay, since these agreements would be strictly between the 
insurer and employee.”).  
136. See Radnofsky, supra note 79.  
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no choice but to offer employees insurance that provides “free” birth 
control as a benefit of employment.137 As one prominent Catholic 
employer surmised, “we would still be in the untenable position of 
facilitating access to drugs that go against our beliefs.”138  
Furthermore, although religious institutions are not forced to choose 
between acting in accordance with their faith and a government benefit, 
they would certainly be exposed to a government penalty if they chose 
not to provide health coverage because of their objections.139 
Undoubtedly, this is the kind of coercion and pressure that the RFRA 
seeks to alleviate when facially neutral regulations conflict with bona fide 
religious belief. Arguably, the Administration has conceded this point by 
retaining the mandate’s “religious employer” exemption in the wake of 
the President’s compromise.140 Had his modification actually relieved the 
free-exercise burdens on non-exempt religious institutions, there would 
be no need to preserve an exemption that offers even more protection to 
qualifying organizations. Nevertheless, the fact that the Administration 
has finalized this exemption “without change”141 suggests that while the 
words used to describe the mandate may have been modified, its moral 
consequences for religious employers remain unaffected.142  
 
137. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8728 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 
147) (requiring that while a religious employer may be offered a policy that 
excludes contraception, the insurer shall simultaneously offer the employees 
of that institution any FDA-approved contraceptive drug or service free of 
charge). 
138. Michael P. Warsaw, Contraception, Against Conscience, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 
21, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/22/opinion/why-ewtn-wont-
cover-contraception.html. 
139. See CHAIKIND & PETERSON, supra note 82, at 136. 
140. Garvey Letter, supra note 80. (“[I]t bears noting that by sustaining the 
original narrow exemptions for churches, auxiliaries, and religious orders, 
the Administration has effectively admitted that the new policy (like the 
old one) amounts to a grave infringement on religious liberty.”); Group 
Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) 
(indicating that the religious employer exemption to the HHS mandate is 
finalized “without change.”). 
141. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147).  
142. See Garvey Letter, supra note 80. (“This so-called “accommodation” 
changes nothing of moral substance and fails to remove the assault on 
religious liberty and the rights of conscience which gave rise to the 
controversy.”). 
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C.  The Burden Shifts: Does the HHS Mandate Survive the RFRA? 
If a religious employer is able to make a prima facie case that its 
free-exercise rights are burdened by the HHS mandate, the government 
will have had to show that the regulation satisfies the compelling 
interest test prescribed by the RFRA.  
1.  Does the Mandate Further a Compelling Government Interest? 
The first prong of the RFRA’s compelling interest analysis focuses 
on whether the government regulation at issue furthers a compelling 
state interest. As the Supreme Court noted in O Centro, this analysis 
can only be satisfied through an application of the challenged law to the 
particular claimant whose sincere religious exercise is being substantially 
burdened.143 As such, a court evaluating a challenge to the federal 
contraceptive mandate by a Catholic institution would have to consider 
whether the government has a compelling interest to require the 
extension of contraceptive benefits to a religious institution’s employees. 
In addition to being narrowly tailored to the limited scope of this 
analysis, the regulation in question would also have to advance interests 
of “the highest order.”144 While the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence has 
yet to define what exactly those interests are, it has nevertheless made 
clear that a mere rational relationship to some colorable interest will not 
suffice.145 
In this case, the government has advanced the interest of promoting 
women’s health and saving healthcare costs by making preventive care, 
including contraception, more readily available.146 This argument is, 
 
143. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
430-31 (2006).  
144. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
546 (1993).  
145. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530 (1945).  
146. See GUTTMACHER TESTIMONY, supra note 26, at 12. Other government 
efforts to mandate contraceptive coverage by employers have been justified 
as promoting the equal treatment of women in the workplace. These 
arguments have been based on Title VII as amended by the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act, and in 2000 the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission ruled that employers who exclude contraception from 
prescription health plans discriminate along gender lines. EEOC Decision 
on Coverage of Contraception, EEOC (Dec. 14, 2000), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/decision-contraception.html. While some 
district courts have acknowledged that combating such discrimination is a 
“compelling state interest ‘of the highest order,’” Werft v. Desert Sw. 
Annual Conference of United Methodist Church, 377 F.3d 1099, 1102 (9th 
Cir. 2004) (quoting Rayburn v. Gen. Conference of Seventh-Day 
Adventists, 772 F.2d 1164, 1169 (4th Cir. 1985)), the appellate courts have 
not accepted this argument. See In re Union Pac. R.R. Emp’t Practices 
Litig., 479 F.3d 936, 943 (8th Cir. 2007) (holding that the Pregnancy 
Discrimination Act does not encompass contraception and that the denial 
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among other things, premised on the proposition that unplanned 
pregnancies will lead to adverse health effects.147 While this may very 
well be true, remedying the situation by making a religious employer 
facilitate access to contraception through its health plan would not 
further the government’s interest in any appreciable way.  
First, it is not entirely clear that employed women who want to use 
prescription contraceptives are unable to do so because their employers 
do not cover them. While certain reports have indicated that women 
who have unintended pregnancies did not use birth control because of 
the financial cost, this data does not tell us whether these women are 
employed and, if so, whether their employer’s refusal to cover 
contraception was the cause of their inability to pay.148 Rather, it is more 
likely that these statistics reflect the situation of unemployed women, 
who would not be affected in the least if the government required 
employers to facilitate access to birth control through their insurers. 
Academic analysis sympathetic to the government’s interest has even 
admitted that “women who are most at risk for unintended pregnancies 
are the least likely to gain any advantage” from compelling an employer 
to offer prescription contraceptives.149 To show that the federal mandate 
would further the government’s interest of promoting greater access to 
women’s healthcare, it would be necessary to demonstrate that women 
who are beneficiaries of employer-sponsored health plans are unable to 
afford to access birth control because their plans do not cover it.150 Given 
the number of private employers who already cover prescription 
contraceptives, this would be a difficult showing to make.  
Today, 90 percent of private employers include contraception in 
their benefit packages.151 The federal government, the nation’s largest 
employer,152 also includes contraceptives in its employee health plans.153 
Requiring that this coverage also be provided by a small minority of 
employers who have chosen not to offer it would, per the Supreme 
Court’s own jurisprudence, hardly constitute a compelling state  
of contraception coverage for both sexes does not discriminate against 
female employees in violation of Title VII).  
147. Stabile, supra note 41, at 770-71. 
148. Id. at 771.  
149. Kuhn, supra note 28, at 367 (emphasis added).  
150. Stabile, supra note 41, at 771. 
151. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, IN BRIEF: FACTS ON CONTRACEPTIVE USE IN THE 
UNITED STATES (2012), available at http://www.guttmacher.org/ 
pubs/fb_contr_use.pdf. 
152. Career Guide to Industries, 2010-11 Edition: Federal Government, U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/oco/cg/cgs041.htm (last visited Feb. 19, 2013) (noting 
that the federal government is the nation’s single largest employer).  
153. GUTTMACHER TESTIMONY, supra note 26, at 11.  
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interest.154 Even if it did, the government cannot defeat a claim under 
the RFRA by arguing that a compelling interest is served by the 
uniform application of a law. Rather, it has to show that the state has a 
significant interest in regulating the particular plaintiff who is 
challenging that law.155  
Furthermore, prescription contraceptives like the FDA-approved 
drugs encompassed by federal mandate are not the only means to 
regulate pregnancy. Just because the pill may be more convenient than a 
condom does not make it a basic health care need, especially when 
contraceptive drugs pose far more health risks156 than these more 
affordable and more readily available methods of birth control.157 
Certainly, it is not the case that a woman would be foreclosed from 
regulating her pregnancies using these methods if her employer chose not 
to cover prescription contraceptives.  
Finally, “a law cannot be regarded as protecting an interest ‘of the 
highest order’ . . . when it leaves appreciable damage to that supposedly 
vital interest unprohibited.”158 Under the ACA, any “grandfathered” 
group health plans that were in effect on March 23, 2010, are not 
required to comply with the HHS mandate, and employers who retain 
less than fifty full time employees are not subject to penalties for failing 
to offer coverage.159 This exemption, which has the potential to 
encompass tens of millions of Americans,160 would necessarily defeat any 
 
154. See Brown v. Entm’t Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2741 (2011) 
(noting that “[f]illing the remaining modest gap” in a government 
regulatory scheme “can hardly be a compelling state interest”).  
155. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 
418, 435 (2006).  
156. The Dark Side of Birth Control: 17 Adverse Health Effects, THE HEALTH 
CRAZIES (May 11, 2010), http://mphdegree.org/2010/the-dark-side-of-
birth-control-17-adverse-health-effects/ (collecting medical studies showing 
seventeen distinct health risks posed by oral contraceptives).  
157. Stabile, supra note 41, at 772. 
158. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 
547 (1993) (quoting Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541-42 (1989) 
(Scalia, J. dissenting)).  
159. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the PPACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 
3, 2011) (“The requirements to cover recommended preventive services 
without any cost-sharing do not apply to grandfathered health plans.”); see 
also 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2011) (providing shared responsibility for 
employers offering health coverage). 
160. The US Census Bureau reports that over 20 million people are employed 
by firms with fewer than twenty employees. This figure does not consider 
the number employed by firms ranging from 20-49 employees, nor the 
number of employees whose health plans will be “grandfathered” under the 
ACA. See Statistics about Business Size, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
http://www.census.gov/econ/smallbus.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2013). 
Health Matrix·Volume 23·Issue 1·2013  
Drafting a “Sensible” Conscience Clause 
381 
claim that the government’s interest in mandating that Catholic 
employers facilitate access to contraceptive coverage through their 
insurers is one of the “highest order.” While the O Centro Court opined 
in dicta that the government might be able to demonstrate “a 
compelling interest . . . by offering evidence that granting the requested 
religious accommodations would seriously compromise its ability to 
administer the program,” the fact that the law in this case does not even 
apply uniformly to non-religious employers renders this argument 
untenable.161  
2.  Is the Mandate the Least Restrictive Means of Furthering a 
Compelling Governmental Interest?  
Even if the HHS mandate did further a compelling governmental 
interest, it does not employ the least restrictive means of doing so. To be 
the least restrictive means of accomplishing the legislature’s goal, a law 
that burdens religious exercise must be both substantively and facially 
neutral. In terms of the First Amendment, a facially neutral law is one 
whose intent is neither to confer a benefit nor impose a burden on the 
practice of religion.162 Substantive neutrality, on the other hand, requires 
that the government “minimize the extent to which it either encourages 
or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice, 
observance or nonobservance.”163 By definition then, a law that is truly 
“substantively neutral” toward religion will use the least restrictive 
means to further a governmental interest. If not, courts may fashion 
exemptions to relieve claimants from these burdens.164   
In this case, the HHS mandate lacks substantive neutrality because 
it is not the least restrictive means of furthering the government’s 
interest. Specifically, its narrow “religious employer exemption” burdens 
religious exercise by imposing arbitrary distinctions between church-
affiliated activities and institutions which the government has deemed to 
be “religious” and those which it has deemed to be “secular.” In doing 
so, the government has ignored the bona fide religious beliefs that form 
the core of these institutions’ mission, identity, and purpose, and has 
presented them with the choice of either modifying their religious 
practice or incurring substantial fines and penalties.  
 
161. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
435 (2006). 
162. Craig W. Mandell, Tough Pill to Swallow: Whether Catholic Institutions 
Are Obligated Under Title VII to Cover Their Employees’ Prescription 
Contraceptives, 8 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 199, 220-
22 (2008). 
163. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality 
Toward Religion, 39 DEPAUL L. REV. 993, 1001 (1990).  
164. See Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 434. 
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While hospitals, schools, and charities may not be “churches” in the 
strict sense of the word, their activities are central to a holistic 
understanding and practice of the Catholic faith. As such, they are not 
considered by the Church to be mere auxiliary or supplementary 
organizations simply related to Catholicism by historical accident. As 
Pope Benedict XVI taught in his encyclical letter Deus caritas est,  
The Church’s deepest nature is expressed in her three-fold 
responsibility: of proclaiming the word of God (kerygma-martyria), 
celebrating the sacraments (leitourgia), and exercising the ministry 
of charity (diakonia). These duties presuppose each other and are 
inseparable. For the Church, charity is not a kind of welfare 
activity which could equally well be left to others, but is a part of 
her nature, an indispensable expression of her very being.165 
Because the activities of Church hospitals, schools, and charities are 
inseparable from Catholic belief and worship, a “religious exemption” 
that excludes these bodies suffers from a “crabbed and constricted” view 
of religion that, in the words of California’s Justice Brown, would 
“define the ministry of Jesus Christ as a secular activity.”166  
Nevertheless, it would seem that the narrow exemption offered by 
the federal mandate is an attempt to do just that. Unfortunately, this is 
remarkably consistent with recent efforts by the Administration to 
downplay the role of religious exercise in the public square. Rather than 
embracing the freedom of religion guaranteed by the First Amendment, 
for example, the Administration’s use of the more restrictive term, 
“freedom of worship,” in many of its public statements reflects an 
understanding that legally protected religious exercise should be limited 
to the four walls of a church, synagogue, or mosque.167 Not surprisingly, 
then, the religious employer exemption to the federal mandate was 
drafted to create a “religious accommodation that respects the unique 
relationship between a house of worship and its employees in ministerial 
positions.”168 Because such an understanding fails to acknowledge that 
the free exercise of religion encompasses more than scheduled Sunday 
 
165. BENEDICT XVI, DEUS CARITAS EST 25 (2005). 
166. Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 106 
(Cal. 2004) (Brown, J., dissenting) 
167. Ashley Samelson, Why “Freedom of Worship” is Not Enough, FIRST 
THINGS (Feb. 22, 2010), available at http://www.firstthings.com/ 
onthesquare/2010/02/why-ldquofreedom-of-worshiprdquo-is-not-enough 
(analyzing the Obama Administration’s substitution of the term “freedom 
of religion” with the more restrictive “freedom of worship” and arguing 
that this rhetorical paradigm shift threatens to leave vital religious liberties 
unprotected).  
168. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the PPACA, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,621, 46,623 (Aug. 
3, 2011) (emphasis added).  
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worship services, it fails to respect the full breadth of legally protected 
religious freedom and, consequently, cannot be the least-restrictive 
means (in First Amendment terms) of furthering a governmental 
interest.169  
Even so, state courts upholding mandated contraceptive-coverage 
laws have argued that it would be impossible for a legislature to fashion 
a religious exemption if it were not permitted to determine which 
organizations are truly religious and which are secular.170 These opinions 
have gone to great lengths to show that the line drawing that results 
from this determination is not religious discrimination of the sort that 
was condemned by the Supreme Court in Larson v. Valente.171 In that 
case, the Court held that a Minnesota statute that excluded the 
Unification Church from an exemption to registration and reporting 
requirements for charitable organizations constituted discrimination 
against a specific religion in violation of the Establishment Clause.172 
Nevertheless, focusing on governmental bias against certain religions 
would tend to misconstrue the constitutional principles at stake in this 
debate. In asking for a broader exemption, Catholic employers are not 
insisting that legislatures abandon their duty of drawing sensible 
distinctions between those bodies deserving of exemption and those that 
are not.173 Nor should they argue that these exemptions constitute 
religious discrimination. Unlike the Unification Church in Larson, 
Catholicism as a denomination is not entirely excluded from the federal 
mandate’s statutory exemption scheme.174 Accordingly, the proper 
 
169. It is a well-established principle of constitutional jurisprudence that 
religious exercise as protected by the First Amendment encompasses much 
more the freedom to worship as one chooses. See Corp. of the Presiding 
Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 341-42 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring) 
(citing Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion 
Clauses: The Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church 
Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 1373, 1389 (1981) (acknowledging that 
“religion includes important communal elements for most believers. They 
exercise their religion through religious organizations and these 
organizations must be protected by the [Free-Exercise] [C]lause.”)).  
170. See, e.g., Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 
67, 79-80 (Cal. 2004); Catholic Charities of Diocese of Albany v. Serio, 859 
N.E.2d 459, 468-69 (N.Y. 2006). It should be noted, however, that these 
cases were decided under Smith and therefore did not consider whether the 
exemptions at issue were the least restrictive means of furthering the 
government’s interest.   
171. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 228 (1982).  
172. Id. 
173. Indeed, the Supreme Court has sanctioned this as a “permissible legislative 
purpose.” Amos, 483 U.S. at 335. 
174. The narrow exemption in the federal mandate may still protect Catholic 
institutions if their primary purpose is religious indoctrination and they do 
not hire and serve non-Catholics. Consequently, just because the 
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analysis in this case should focus not on whether the exemption fosters 
religious establishment (because it plainly does not), but on whether it 
sufficiently protects religious exercise. When viewed in this light, a 
narrow exemption that fails to alleviate the significant burdens on 
countless church-affiliated institutions cannot be said to protect the full 
scope of constitutionally protected religious freedom as it has been 
defined and understood by the courts.175  
When the state has attempted to stifle religious exercise by imposing 
narrow definitions of religion on faith-based institutions, it has 
consistently met with judicial rebuke. In National Labor Relations Board 
v. The Catholic Bishop of Chicago, for example, the Supreme Court 
considered whether Catholic high schools were entitled to an exemption 
from NLRB jurisdiction over collective bargaining units for lay teachers 
and staff.176 While the NLRB maintained that its policy was to decline 
jurisdiction over religiously sponsored organizations “only when they are 
completely religious, not just religiously associated,”177 the Court found 
that this determination would necessarily involve some degree of 
entanglement between church and state.178 Accordingly, the Court 
affirmed the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that the NLRB’s distinction 
between “completely religious” and “religiously associated” organizations 
was “a simplistic black or white, purported rule containing no borderline 
demarcation of where ‘completely religious’ takes over or, on the other 
hand, ceases.”179 Because such an inquiry would implicate “very sensitive 
questions of faith and tradition,”180 the Supreme Court declined to 
extend the NLRB’s authority to the schools for fear that “intrusion into 
this area could run afoul of the Religion Clauses and hence preclude [the 
NLRB’s] jurisdiction on constitutional grounds.”181 
Lower courts have applied a similar analysis to cases involving 
government attempts to define religiosity. When, for example, Colorado 
sought to exclude “pervasively sectarian” institutions of higher education 
from its state scholarship program, the Tenth Circuit found that the 
 
exemption does not cover all Catholic institutions does not mean that it 
discriminates against Catholicism along the lines condemned in Larson. See 
Catholic Charities of Sacramento, 85 P.3d at 85, n.10. 
175. See Amos, 483 U.S. at 341-42 (Brennan, J., concurring). 
176. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490, 491, 493 (1979).  
177. Id. at 493 (quoting Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Baltimore, 216 NLRB 
249, 250 (1975)). 
178. See id. at 499. 
179. Id. at 495 (quoting Catholic Bishop of Chi. v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1118 
(7th Cir. 1977)).  
180. Id. (quoting Catholic Bishop of Chi. v. NLRB, 559 F.2d 1112, 1118 (7th 
Cir. 1977)). 
181. Id. at 499. 
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state violated constitutional doctrine prohibiting government from 
measuring an institution’s religious beliefs and practices.182 By far, the 
“most potentially intrusive element” of Colorado’s statutory scheme was 
the requirement that the state determine whether the school in question 
had the “primary purpose” of proselytizing students.183 Because these 
statutory metrics for determining whether an institution is sufficiently 
religious for the purposes of government regulation have been 
consistently condemned by the Supreme Court, the Tenth Circuit found 
that the Colorado statute at issue violated the First Amendment.184 
In University of Great Falls v. National Labor Relations Board, the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit also 
applied the Supreme Court’s holding in Catholic Bishop to conclude that 
a church-affiliated university did not fall under the authority of the 
NLRB.185 There, the Board asserted jurisdiction based on a finding that 
the university in question, owned by the Roman Catholic Sisters of 
Providence, did not have “a substantial religious character” because “the 
propagation of a religious faith” was not “the primary purpose” of the 
school.186 In making this determination about the religious mission of the 
university, however, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the Board had 
“engaged in the sort of intrusive inquiry that Catholic Bishop sought to 
avoid.”187 Because the Board’s “substantial religious character” test 
boiled down to the question of whether an institution is “sufficiently 
religious,” the court denounced it as an inquiry into religious views that 
is “not only unnecessary but also offensive.”188 Deciding that this test 
would create the same constitutional concerns that the Supreme Court 
sought to avoid in Catholic Bishop, the court roundly denounced the 
NLRB’s practice of “trolling through the beliefs of the University, 
making determinations about its religious mission, and that mission’s 
centrality to the ‘primary purpose’” of the school.189  
Importantly, and germane to the federal mandate at issue here, the 
court acknowledged that narrow definitions of religion fail to consider 
the breath of religious freedom protected by the First Amendment. Just 
because the University of Great Falls was “ecumenical and open-
minded” did not “make it any less religious, nor NLRB interference any 
 
182. Colorado Christian Univ. v. Weaver, 534 F.3d 1245, 1261 (10th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 795 (2000)). 
183. Id. 
184. Id. at 1263. 
185. Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1347-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002).  
186. Id. at 1340. 
187. Id. at 1341.  
188. Id. at 1341, 1343.  
189. Id. at 1342.  
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less a potential infringement of religious liberty.”190 Analogously, limiting 
an exemption to religious institutions that engage in “hard-nosed 
proselytizing,” limit their enrollment “to members of their religion,” and 
have “no academic freedom,” would be “an unnecessarily stunted view of 
the law.”191 This, in turn, would threaten to violate the basic premise 
underlying the First Amendment’s religion clause—”not to prefer some 
religions (and thereby some approaches to indoctrinating religion) to 
others.”192 Because the NLRB’s narrow definition of a religious 
institution mirrors the standard articulated by the “religious employer” 
exemption to the HHS mandate, it is likely that the denunciation of that 
test as “constitutionally infirm” would similarly apply to the 
government’s exemption scheme in this case.  
To determine eligibility for the HHS mandate’s religious employer 
exemption, for example, the government will necessarily have to decide 
whether an institution’s understanding and practice of its religious 
mission translates into a primary purpose of “inculcating religious 
values.”193 For a Catholic hospital, school, or charity that inculcates 
religious values by serving others, the answer is quite obvious. 
Nevertheless, the federal government would probably disagree, and 
because “the prospect of church and state litigating . . . about what does 
or does not have religious meaning touches the very core of the 
constitutional guarantee against religious establishment,” a court is 
likely to find that the HHS mandate’s narrow exemption is not the 
“least restrictive” means of furthering a governmental interest.194  
V. A “Sensible” Solution 
If Catholic institutions are able to demonstrate that the HHS 
mandate significantly burdens their free-exercise rights in violation of the 
RFRA, federal courts are empowered to create individualized exemptions 
that will be as numerous as there are Catholic hospitals, universities, 
and charities that choose to challenge the mandate in court.195 While 
some initial challenges to the mandate have been dismissed because the 
rulemaking process is not yet complete (and therefore claims by religious 
organizations are arguably not yet ripe), other federal courts have 
indicated that employers challenging the mandate have a high likelihood 
 
190. Id. at 1346.  
191. Id. 
192. Id. 
193. 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(iv)(B)(1) (2011). 
194. New York v. Cathedral Acad., 434 U.S. 125, 133 (1977). 
195. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 
434 (2006) (“RFRA, however plainly contemplates that courts would 
recognize exceptions—that is how the law works.”). 
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of success on the merits.196 To avoid the litigious and administrative 
nightmare that would result from this scenario, it is in the 
Administration’s best interests to fashion a broader exemption that 
would encompass organizations that, while not “churches” in and of 
themselves, derive their purpose and mission from religious principles.  
A.  Federalism-Based Solutions to the Contraceptive Coverage Dilemma  
Expounding on the genius of the federalist system, the Supreme 
Court described state sovereignty in New York v. United States as “not 
just an end in itself: rather, federalism secures to citizens the liberties 
that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”197 As the Court would 
later explain, this emphasis on subsidiarity in our federal system has 
encouraged local policies “more sensitive to the diverse needs of a 
heterogeneous society,” including “innovation and experimentation,” 
which enables “greater citizen involvement in democratic processes” and 
makes government “more responsive by putting the States in 
competition for a mobile citizenry.”198 
Consistent with their role as legislative laboratories that reflect the 
diverse values and needs of the American people, many state legislatures 
have already addressed the issue of prescription contraceptive coverage 
by effectively balancing calls for equity in employee health care with the 
moral concerns of their constituents. Although its exact origins are 
unclear, it appears that the campaign for mandated prescription 
contraceptive coverage began soon after insurance plans started covering 
 
196. Two federal district courts have dismissed, for now, challenges to the 
mandate on the grounds that because the Administration’s rule-making 
process for applying the mandate to non-exempt religious employers is not 
yet complete, religious institutions cannot satisfy “injury in fact” or 
ripeness requirements for standing. See Belmont Abbey Coll. v. Sebelius, 
878 F. Supp. 2d 25 (D.D.C. 2012); Nebraska ex rel. Bruning v. U.S. Dept. 
of Health & Human Services, 877 F. Supp. 2d 777 (D. Neb. 2012). It 
should be noted that neither of these courts reached the merits of the 
plaintiffs’ First Amendment and RFRA claims. Because the temporary 
enforcement safe-harbor only applies to non-exempt religious organizations, 
however, private employers challenging the mandate on free-exercise 
grounds have not been affected by standing or ripeness concerns. In 
Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012), for example, 
Judge John L. Kane of the US District Court for the District of Colorado 
granted a temporary restraining order prohibiting the government from 
enforcing the mandate against Hercules Industries Inc., a private employer 
challenging the mandate on free-exercise grounds. In his opinion, Judge 
Kane found that any alleged governmental interest in enforcing the 
mandate against Hercules “pales in comparison to the possible infringement 
upon Plaintiffs’ constitutional and statutory rights.” Id. at 1295. 
197. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) (citing Coleman v. 
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)). 
198. Bond v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 2355, 2364 (2011) (internal citations and 
quotations omitted). 
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the male impotency drug Viagra.199 To date, twenty-eight states require 
insurers who cover prescription drugs to provide coverage of the full 
range of FDA-approved contraceptive drugs and devices.200 Twenty of 
these states exempt certain employers from the mandate, usually for 
religious reasons.201 In providing such an exemption, these state 
legislatures have engaged in what the Supreme Court has sanctioned as 
“a permissible legislative purpose” in order to “alleviate significant 
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to 
define and carry out their religious missions.”202 Of these states, only five 
have defined a “religious employer” using the terms adopted by the 
Federal Government in the current mandate implementing the ACA.203 
These include California, Hawaii, New York, North Carolina, and 
Oregon.204 Another five have used a similarly restrictive definition taken 
from Section 3121 of the Internal Revenue Code.205 The remaining ten 
 
199. Kuhn, supra note 28, at 355; see also Carey Goldberg, Insurance for 
Viagra Spurs Coverage for Birth Control, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 1999, at 
A1 (discussing the link between Viagra coverage and the demand for 
contraceptive coverage). But see Stabile, supra note 41, at 770 (arguing 
that there is no validity to the claim that contraceptive coverage is 
necessary to promote equal treatment of women because Viagra coverage is 
not analogous to contraceptive coverage). 
200. These states include Arizona, Arkansas, California,  
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,  
Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West 
Virginia and Wisconsin. It should be noted, however, that  
Michigan and Montana require insurance coverage of contraceptives as a 
result of an administrative ruling or an Attorney General  
opinion. GUTTMACHER INSTITUTE, STATE POLICIES IN BRIEF, INSURANCE 
COVERAGE OF CONTRACEPTIVES (2012), available at 
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_ICC.pdf.  
201. Id.  
202. Corp. of Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1978).  
203. See supra notes 9-10.  
204. See CAL. INS. CODE §§ 10123.196(d)(1)(A)-(D) (West 2012); HAW. REV. 
STAT. § 431:10A-116.7(a) (1999); N.Y. INS. LAW § 4303(cc)(1)(A) 
(McKinney 2012); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-3-178 (West 2012); OR. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 743A.066 (West 2008). 
205. Federal Insurance Contributions Act, 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 3121(w)(3)(A)-(B) 
(2011) (defining a “church” as “a church, convention, or association of 
churches, or an elementary or secondary school which is controlled, 
operated, or principally supported by a church or by a convention or 
association of churches” and a “qualified church-controlled organization” as 
any tax-exempt organization described in § 501(c)(3) other than an 
organization which “offers goods, services, or facilities for sale . . . to the 
general public” and “normally receives more than 25 percent of its support 
from either (I) governmental sources, or (II) receipts from admissions, sales 
of merchandise, performance of services, or furnishing of facilities, in 
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states employ a wide variety of religious exemptions, all of which use 
broad language to define a religious employer that can claim an 
exemption from the contraceptive coverage mandate.206 Many of these 
states do not even attempt to define “religious employer” and accept any 
bona fide religious objection as grounds for exemption from the mandate.  
Arizona’s contraceptive coverage law, for example, provides that “a 
religious employer whose religious tenets prohibit the use of prescribed 
contraceptive methods may require that the accountable health plan 
provide a health benefits plan without coverage for all federal Food and 
Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods.”207 Under this 
exemption, all a religious employer is required to do is submit an 
affidavit to the health plan provider stating that it is a religious 
employer, at which point “the accountable health plan shall issue to the 
employer a health benefits plan that excludes coverage of prescription 
contraceptive methods.”208  
Similarly, Delaware’s mandate provides an exemption to employers if 
“the required coverage conflicts with the religious organization’s bona 
fide religious beliefs and practices.”209 As with many other state 
exemption statutes, the employer is then required to provide its 
employees reasonable and timely notice of the exclusion. Missouri’s 
statute extends the exemption from its contraceptive mandate beyond 
churches and organizations to cover individual conscientious objectors as 
well. In pertinent part, it provides that “[a]ny health carrier may issue to 
any person or entity purchasing a health benefit plan, a . . . plan that 
excludes coverage for contraceptives if the use or provision of such 
contraceptives is contrary to the moral, ethical or religious beliefs or 
tenets of such person or entity.”210  
The success that many states have had in balancing prescription 
contraceptive coverage with bona fide religious objections is evident from 
 
activities which are not unrelated trades or businesses, or both.”). This 
language would suggest that Catholic hospitals and universities, which 
provide services for sale to the general public, would not be exempt from 
state mandates using this definition of a “religious employer.”  
206. These states include Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Delaware, Maryland, 
Missouri, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and West Virginia. See ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. § 20-2329(F) (West 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-1104 
(West 2007); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 38a-530e (West 2010); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit. 18, § 3559 (West 2010); MD. CODE ANN., INS. § 15-826(c)(1) 
(West 2012); MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.119 (West 2012); NEV. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 689A.0417 (West 1999); N.M. STAT. ANN.  
§ 59A-46-44 (West 2012); TEX. INS. CODE ANN. § 1369.108 (West 2012); 
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-16E-7 (LexisNexis 2011). 
207. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-2329(B) (West 2011). 
208. Id.  
209. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 3559 (West 2010). 
210. MO. ANN. STAT. § 376.119 (West 2012). 
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the lack of any substantive legal or political challenges that have arisen 
in the states that include a broad conscience clause in their mandate. To 
date, the only evidence of political upheaval at the state level has been 
found in New York and California, where institutional Catholic 
employers have challenged their respective state contraceptive mandates 
in court. Significantly, both of these states enforce the narrow “religious 
employer” exemption that is currently codified in the federal mandate. 
Looking to the example of states that have codified broader exemptions, 
the federal government can avoid costly and time-consuming litigation 
(and preserve goodwill with religious institutions) by adopting a more 
inclusive exemption that would accommodate the conscientious 
objections of institutional Catholic employers. 
B.  Avoiding “Excessive Entanglement” Between Church and State: 
Modeling a Broader Exemption on Section 414(e) of the  
Internal Revenue Code 
When he offered his accommodation to religious employers, 
President Obama did not broaden the exemption already codified in the 
HHS mandate.211 Rather, as discussed above, non-exempt religious 
employers will still be compelled to facilitate access to “free” 
contraceptive coverage for their employees simply by offering a health 
plan.212 This modification, however, fails to alleviate significant free-
exercise concerns because it compels a Catholic institutional employer to 
materially cooperate in a practice that the Church condemns as 
“intrinsically evil.”213 
In his letter to HHS Secretary Kathleen Sibelius, Notre Dame 
President Fr. John Jenkins suggested that the Administration look to 
the language of Section 414(e) of the Internal Revenue Code as one 
possibility for a broader religious exemption to the federal mandate.214 
Defining religious organizations that are exempt from certain provisions 
of the Internal Revenue Code, Section 414(e) deems an organization to 
be “associated with a church” and thus subject to exemption “if it shares 
common religious bonds and convictions with that church.”215 Focusing  
211. Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of 
Preventive Services Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 
77 Fed. Reg. 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147) 
(indicating that the religious employer exemption to the HHS mandate is 
finalized “without change.”).  
212. Id. at 8728. The HHS mandate requires that insurers simultaneously offer 
health plans without contraceptive coverage to religious employers while 
offering contraceptives free of charge to their employees. Such a scenario 
guarantees free access to contraceptives for employees of Catholic 
institutions so long as their employer offers health insurance.  
213. CATECHISM, supra note 8, § 2370, at 570.  
214. Jenkins Letter, supra note 12.  
215. 26 U.S.C. § 414(e)(3)(D) (2006). 
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on an institution’s organizational ties to religion rather than the nature 
of its religious practice, such an exemption would avoid excessive 
entanglement between church and state and, in doing so, further the 
government’s interest in a less-restrictive manner.  
In construing this Section, courts have articulated various tests that 
expound on the letter and spirit of Section 414(e). The Fourth Circuit, 
for example, has held that a determination of whether an organization 
shares common bonds and convictions with a church turns on three 
factors: “(1) whether the religious institution plays any official role in 
the governance of the organization; (2) whether the organization receives 
assistance from the religious institution; and (3) whether a 
denominational requirement exists for any employee or patient/customer 
of the organization.”216 Importantly, this analysis “does not ask about 
the centrality of beliefs or how important the religious mission is to the 
institution” and thus avoids excessive entanglement between church and 
state.217  
Because of their organizational ties with the Church, Catholic 
hospitals, schools, and charities would likely be included in an exemption 
based on institutional and organizational ties to religion. First, the 
Catholic Church plays a direct and official role in the governance of its 
hospitals, schools, charities, and other social service organizations. The 
US Conference of Catholic Bishops, for example, promulgates Ethical 
and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services, which, in 
addition to defining the theological and moral principles underlying 
Catholic health care, stipulate that “Catholic health care services must 
adopt these Directives as policy, require adherence to them within the 
institution as a condition for medical privileges and employment, and 
provide appropriate instruction  
regarding the Directives for Administration, medical and nursing staff, 
and other personnel.”218 Furthermore, Catholic universities are governed 
by the Apostolic Constitution Ex corde ecclesiae, which mandates that 
church-affiliated institutions of higher learning “must have the 
following essential characteristics”: 
(1) A Christian inspiration not only of individuals but of the 
university community as such; (2) A continuing reflection in the 
light of the Catholic faith upon the growing treasury of human 
knowledge, to which it seeks to contribute by its own research; (3) 
Fidelity to the Christian message as it comes to us through the 
 
216. Lown v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 238 F.3d 543, 548 (4th Cir. 2001).  
217. Univ. of Great Falls v. NLRB, 278 F.3d 1335, 1344 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
218. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND 
RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES 12 (2009), 
available at http://www.usccb.org/issues-and-action/human-life-and-
dignity/health-care/upload/Ethical-Religious-Directives-Catholic-Health-
Care-Services-fifth-edition-2009.pdf. 
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Church; (4) An institutional commitment to the service of the 
people of God and of the human family in their pilgrimage to the 
transcendent goal which gives meaning to life.219 
Additionally, theology professors at Catholic universities must receive a 
mandate to teach from the local bishop, and non-Catholic academics are 
not permitted to comprise a majority of the institution’s faculty.220  
These definitions of what constitutes an authentically Catholic 
institution are by no means simple guidelines or suggestions. The Code 
of Canon Law provides that “no undertaking is to claim the name 
Catholic without the consent of competent ecclesiastical authority,”221 
and in recent times Catholic bishops have acted to sever organizational 
ties with institutions that have acted contrary to Church teaching.222 
Additionally, many Catholic bishops and priests often serve as 
presidents, trustees, and chief executive officers of Catholic hospitals, 
universities, and charities.223 These institutions also receive direct 
financial assistance from the Church and operate under the authority of 
local bishops and other competent ecclesiastical authorities.224  
In some cases, the organizational ties demanded by a Section 414(e)-
style exemption may not cover all employers objecting to the mandate 
on free-exercise grounds. If such an exemption failed to alleviate a 
burden on an organization’s bona fide religious exercise, however, it 
 
219. JOHN PAUL II, EX CORDE ECCLESIAE 13 (1990).  
220. Id. at Article IV, §§ 3-4, at 33.  
221. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH, CODE OF CANON LAW § 216 (1983), available at 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/ENG1104/__PU.HTM. 
222. See, e.g., ROMAN CATHOLIC DIOCESE OF PHOENIX, DECREE REVOKING 
EPISCOPAL CONSENT TO CLAIM THE “CATHOLIC” NAME ACCORDING TO 
CANON 216 (2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/health/ 
documents/abortion/bishopdecree.pdf (explaining a Catholic bishop’s 
decision to revoke the name “Catholic” from a hospital in his diocese that 
provided contraceptive services and abortion).  
223. See, e.g., Our Leadership, CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA, 
http://www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/who-we-are/our-leadership/ (last 
visited Feb. 17, 2013) (noting that as of February 2013, the President of 
Catholic Charities USA is Rev. Larry Snyder); Lines Crossed: Separation 
of Church and State. Has the Obama Administration Trampled on 
Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Conscience? Before the H. 
Committee on Oversight & Government Reform, 112th Cong. (2012) 
(statement of John Garvey, President of the Catholic University of 
America), available at http://oversight.house.gov/images/ 
stories/Testimony/2-16-12_Full_HC_Mandate_Garvey_Complete.pdf 
(noting that twenty-four of CUA’s forty-eight elected board members must 
be Catholic clerics).  
224. Fred Kammer, 10 Ways Catholic Charities are Catholic,  
CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA 3 (1998), available at 
http://www.ccmke.org/CatholicCharities/pdf/TenWays.pdf. 
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could still have recourse to the courts, which may grant individual 
exemptions to the mandate.225 Indeed, initial challenges to the law have 
shown that despite their lack of institutional ties to religion, private 
employers objecting to the mandate on free-exercise grounds may 
nevertheless have a high likelihood of success on their claims.226  
The adoption of a Section 414(e)-style exemption would, however, 
relieve the courts of adjudicating the most serious claims brought by 
institutional religious employers whose structural ties to the Catholic 
Church require that they either break the law or act contrary to the 
religious teachings that form the basis of their identity. 
Conclusion 
Ultimately, the balance between the interests of the secular state 
and the conscientious objections of religious institutions cannot be 
achieved by simple attempts to legislate “a wall of separation” between 
the two. What the founders of this nation accomplished, and what we 
can strive to achieve today, however, is a “sensible” balance between the 
interests represented by these separate, yet equally important 
participants in American democracy.227  
Given the strength and vitality of religious institutions in American 
life, this is a compromise that we cannot afford to put off. To date, the 
emerging tensions between the Obama Administration and the Catholic 
Church in the United States have led to increasingly strained relations 
between the two.228 In response to the present controversy, Pope 
Benedict XVI has asked that “the entire Catholic community in the 
United States come to realize the grave threats to the Church’s public 
moral witness presented by a radical secularism which finds increasing 
expression in the political and cultural spheres.”229 Making an oblique 
 
225. The Supreme Court has specifically acknowledged that the existence of a 
legislative exemption does not preclude the courts from creating additional 
exemptions under the RFRA. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 434 (2006).  
226. See Newland v. Sebelius, 881 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (D. Colo. 2012) (granting 
preliminary injunctive relief to a private employer challenging the mandate 
under the RFRA). 
227. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior Court, 85 P.3d 67, 
99 (Cal. 2004) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“By protecting religious groups 
from gratuitous state interference, we convey broad benefits on individuals 
and society. By underestimating the transformative potential of religious 
organizations, we impoverish our political discourse and imperil the 
foundations of liberal democracy.”).  
228. Jerry Markon, Catholic Groups’ Ire at Obama Is Growing, WASH. POST, 
Nov. 1, 2011, at A1. 
229. Pope Benedict XVI, Address to the Bishops of the United States of 
America on Their “Ad Limina” Visit (Jan. 19, 2012), available at 
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reference to the HHS mandate, the Pope expressed his concern about 
“certain attempts being made to limit that most cherished of American 
freedoms, the freedom of religion,” including “efforts . . . to deny the 
right of conscientious objection on the part of Catholic individuals and 
institutions with regard to cooperation in intrinsically evil practices.”230 
This, he noted, is indicative of a “tendency to reduce religious freedom 
to mere freedom of worship without guarantees of respect for freedom of 
conscience.”231 Pope Benedict’s sentiments have been echoed by a variety 
of religious leaders, both Catholic and non-Catholic, who have made it 
very clear that the controversy over the HHS mandate is not so much 
about contraception as it is about the freedom of religious institutions to 
determine their own policies on matters implicating faith and morals.232  
This, of course, can be a difficult balance to strike when a religious 
institution’s beliefs intersect with its responsibilities to provide adequate 
health insurance coverage to its employees. Ultimately, however, a 
religious institution being forced to cooperate in the proliferation of what 
it deems to be sinful products and services simply by offering a health 
plan raises concerns that transcend the morality of birth control. Rather, 
this issue speaks to the right of all Americans to act in accordance with 
their conscience without fear of governmental pressure or intrusion. In 
asking for a broader exemption to the HHS mandate, Catholic 
institutions are not demanding that their employees refrain from using 
contraception. They are simply asking that the government acknowledge 
their free-exercise interest in not cooperating with those who choose to 
do so. Precisely because the HHS mandate’s narrow exemption places 
Catholic institutions that reach out to the world in the “impossible 
position” of offering such cooperation, Congress should act to repeal it; 
given the political realities currently foreclosing that outcome,233 
however, the rule should at least be modified with a “sensible” 
conscience clause that will avert unnecessary conflict between Church 
and State.  
 
 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2012/january 
/documents/hf_ben-xvi_spe_20120119_bishops-usa_en.html. 
230. Id. 
231. Id. 
232. Michelle Bauman, US Clergy Declare ‘State of Emergency’ Over 
Contraception Mandate, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Feb. 23, 2012, 2:05 
AM), http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/us-clergy-declare-state-of-
emergency-over-contraception-mandate/. 
233. Michelle Bauman, Senate Rejects Blunt Amendment to Defend Religious 
Freedom, CATHOLIC NEWS AGENCY (Mar. 1, 2012, 1:31 PM), 
http://www.catholicnewsagency.com/news/senate-rejects-blunt-
amendment-to-defend-religious-freedom/.  
